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Abstract
Data driven segmentation is the powerhouse behind the success of online advertising. Var-
ious underlying challenges for successful segmentation have been studied by the academic
community, with one notable exception − consumers incentives have been typically ignored.
This lacuna is troubling as consumers have much control over the data being collected. Miss-
ing or manipulated data could lead to inferior segmentation. The current work proposes a
model of prior-free segmentation, inspired by models of facility location, and to the best of our
knowledge provides the first segmentation mechanism that addresses incentive compatibility,
efficient market segmentation and privacy in the absence of a common prior.
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1 Introduction
Segmentation is considered as one of the crucial marketing processes for many firms and is viewed
as the process of dividing the market into groups of customers or consumers with similar needs.1
Segmentation is the core process leading to, inter alia, market positioning, product definition,
campaigns, pricing and distribution channels.2 3
Market segmentation has traditionally been based on geographic and demographic attributes
of the consumers. However, with the prevalence of consumers’ online footprint and in particular
with usage and consumption data many firms find psychographic (also known as ’lifestyle’) and
behavioral segmentation much more efficient (see [29]). One can safely say that segmentation,
and in particular psychographic and behavioral segmentation, is central in multi billion dollar mar-
kets. The online advertising business alone, which is primarily based on behavioral segmentation
(sometimes referred to as targeting), is currently estimated at nearly 50 USD billion annually in
the USA alone, with 17% growth rates [26].
Modern behavioral and psychographic segmentation techniques, apart from relying on large
amounts of data, also differ from the more traditional segmentation strategies in that they utilize
diverse data sources, most of which are on-line. Some examples of these diverse data sources are
small files called cookies that are downloaded to the user’s browser and facilitate the collection
of browsing history, search engines that collect the history of search terms, on-line retailers (e.g.,
eBay or Amazon) that collect purchase records, and services where subscription and registration is
required that collect our personal information (such as age, address, gender). All these data sources
can now be integrated into the segmentation process. One important thing to note about all these
data sources is that the individual consumer can have significant control on the data provided. For
example, he may choose not to install cookies or to provide partial, or even false information in
a registration process. He may choose not to buy things or restrict his shopping to some specific
category. He may choose to be a proactive member of a social network (e.g., use Facebook’s like
functionality and post to his wall frequently) or use it in a passive manner only. All of this stands
1The Wikipedia entry for ‘Market segmentation’ begins as follows: “Market segmentation is a marketing strategy
that involves dividing a broad target market into subsets of consumers who have common needs and priorities, and
then designing and implementing strategies to target them. Market segmentation strategies may be used to identify the
target customers, and provide supporting data for positioning to achieve a marketing plan objective. Businesses may
develop product differentiation strategies, or an undifferentiated approach, involving specific products or product lines
depending on the specific demand and attributes of the target segment.”
2For more on segmentation and (third degree) price discrimination see Varian [45] for the the monopoly setting
and Stole [42]) for the oligopoly setting.
3To support this consider the following quote from Wind [48]: ”Marketing segmentation long has been considered
one of the most fundamental concepts of modern marketing. In the 20 years since the pioneering works by Wendell
Smith, segmentation has become a dominant concept in marketing literature and practice. Besides being one of
the major ways of operationalizing the marketing concept, segmentation provides guidelines for a firm’s marketing
strategy and resource allocation among markets and products. Faced with heterogeneous markets, a firm following
a market segmentation strategy can increase the expected profitability . . . realizing the potential benefits of market
segmentation requires both management acceptance of the concept and an empirical segmentation study . . .”
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in stark contrast with the more traditional segmentation. Indeed geographic and demographic
segmentation relied mostly on publicly available data and hence was not subjected to potential
manipulation by consumers.
Surprisingly, most firms involved in segmentation take it for granted that the data they collect
indeed accurately reflects the consumer and so, for the purpose of segmentation, they choose to
ignore the possible strategic manipulation of the data. In the jargon of classical mechanism design
consumers are assumed truthful, even if this cannot be justified either theoretically or empirically.
In this paper we take issue with the (implicit) assumption of truthfulness on consumers’ behalf
and study segmentation under the working hypothesis that players do act strategically. Thus, we
study segmentation when consumers are aware that their data is collected and used for segmenta-
tion. To establish a coherent model we actually assume that consumers are fully rational and also
knowledgeable about the way data is used to further encourage them to consume.
The model we propose is inspired by the following stylized description of the segmentation
process as a four stage process:
1. Consumers are asked to provide the data that describes them. One can think of this as a
vector of inputs, where each entry is the value for some given attribute (e.g., gender, income,
frequency of visits to Facebook, total dollar consumption on eBay, etc.). In our abstract
model we refer to this as a point in the N -dimensional unit cube, T = [0, 1]N . Whereas the
true data is some point t ∈ T the consumer may report any value b ∈ T , as the data is not
verifiable.
2. The firm partitions the set of consumers into a fixed number of segments, say K (in our
model K will be set exogenously). Informally, segments are generated such that each one is
as homogeneous as possible and any two segments are as distinct as possible. In our model
the notion of homogeneity and distinction are captured via a metric on T .
3. Within each segment a representative consumer is identified. This may be an actual con-
sumer or a virtual one. The representative consumer is the one that maximizes the average
similarity with the consumers within the segment. In some sense this step and the previous
one may be flipped and at the preliminary stage K representative agents are identified in
such a way that minimizes the average distinction between a consumer and the representa-
tive agent most similar to him. The choice of K representative agents naturally induces a
partition of the set of consumers into K segments. Indeed, this reversed process is the one
captured by our model and mechanism.
4. The firm’s endeavors (products, campaigns, pricing, etc.) are focused to satisfy the K repre-
sentative consumers.
To demonstrate the above process consider an on-line retailer such as Booking.com which has
at its disposal a variety of promotional tools and would like to use the optimal combination of such
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tools for its registered user base. For example, Booking.com may propose discounts at country-
side boutique hotels or weekend getaways in big cities, it may offer a buy-two-nights-get-one-free
for early booking or last-minute all inclusive deals and so on and so forth. Proposing the full
arsenal of promotions to all of its customers may prove unproductive and possibly not optimal.
The typical way to better match propositions with customers is via segmentation. To identify these
segments Booking.com would refer to some customer data. Such data may be collected from
internal sources (e.g., the registration form or past reservations or bookings on Booking.com) or
from external sources such as purchasing data from social networks, data from cookies in some
on-line retail stores and search queries to name a few. Once the data is collected the customer base
can be segmented.
The data driven segmentation process may lead to a segment defined, for example, by activity
on children entertainment websites (e.g., www.nick.com, the Nickelodeon website) coupled with
the age between 25-40 (taken from the registration form), suggesting a family with young kids.
Alternatively, activity on Facebook coupled with a recent purchase from online jewelry retailers
may determine an ‘upper-class newly weds’ segment. Once the segmentation process is over it is
the role of the marketing department to depict the ‘representative customer’ to which the optimal
menu of propositions is tailored.4
The challenges underlying this process are overwhelming. The need to collect and save large
amounts of data, the need to make cross references between a variety of data sources, the optimal
way to save the data in a concise and aggregated manner without losing too much knowledge, the
complexity of computing optimal segments and more. Many of these challenges have been stud-
ied and (partly) resolved. However, one aspect of the segmentation process which has remained
untreated (to the best of our knowledge) is the issue of truthfulness of the data, or more generally
the underlying incentives of the consumers and how they affect the outcome of the segmentation
process. In fact, the process of behavioral segmentation, which is key to successful marketing for
many firms, is a natural mechanism design challenge. It is quite surprising to witness, therefore,
the lack of literature on segmentation within the mechanism design community. This motivates
the current study, where we frame segmentation as a mechanism design challenge and propose a
mechanism that is nearly optimal while accounting for consumers’ incentives.
1.1 Targeted advertising
Our segmentation model is directly inspired by the ‘targeted advertising’ industry, which is one of
the fastest growing industries in the recent decade. This is evident from the current market size. In
USA alone the estimated revenues for Internet advertising in 2014, of which targeted advertising
forms the lion’s share, neared $50 billion, up 17% from the the 2013 revenues (see [26]).
4In many retail companies the process of defining the ‘representative customer’ is quite an intricate and complex
process. They are often given a full background, including age, gender, names, profession, habits and so on. This
is then used as a means to align all the marketing efforts - for example, pricing of goods, communications channels,
packaging and promotions.
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Targeted advertising is primarily centered around behavioral segmentation for on-line adver-
tising. To demonstrate targeted advertising we consider a firm, say Nike, which would like to
maximize the consumers attention to its new product (e.g., new line of running shoes) via its on-
line advertisement. To do so the firm plans to post advertisements on the Sports Illustrated website.
The firm may design a few different variants of the advertisement, say with different colors, themes
and messages. The underlying process which determines the nature of each of these advertisements
is segmentation. Once the segmentation process is done ad variants are designed to optimally ap-
peal to each segment. In real-time, that is when a consumer visits the aforementioned publisher’s
website, the firm must decide (almost instantaneously) which ad variant to expose to the consumer
with the objective that the consumer will click on the ad which, in turn, may lead to purchasing the
firm’s product. Thus, the challenge for targeted advertising is choosing a set of advertisements and
associating with each consumer the one most likely to get his attention with the overall objective
of maximizing the click through rate (CTR) on advertisements.
1.2 Our Contribution
This paper initiates the study of consumer segmentation schemes and the way consumers’ incentive
constraints effect the quality and quantity of the data consumers disclose. This data, in turn, effects
the quality of the resulting segments. The context of our model is that of on-line advertising
and hence we consider the standard objective function used in this industry which is Click Thru
Rates (CTR). We provide a rigorous model for the segmentation design challenge and present
a segmentation mechanism that is incentive compatible and (almost) optimal.5 The scheme we
provide uses a biased coin to decide between a quantal response mechanism (one which assigns
higher probabilities to better segmentations) and an oblivious mechanism which mostly ignores the
data. The randomness at the heart of our construction is powerful enough to induce truthfulness
and (almost) efficiency even for a strong solution concept such as a single elimination of dominated
strategies.
Our solution concept, which is adequate for the prior free setting we study, is that of a strategy
tuples which survive a single deletion of dominated strategies.
In addition, we discuss privacy issues related to the usage of on-line consumer data and show
that, in addition, our segmentation process is relatively immune to privacy concerns.
1.3 Related Work
We turn to discuss related work from a variety of disciplines: economics, marketing, operations
research and machine learning.
5The notion of incentive compatibility is ambiguous as it depends on which solution concept one has in mind. The
solution concept considered in this paper is that of undominated strategies.
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The economics literature deals extensively with the notion of differential pricing (see e.g. [45]
and [42] for some overview). In that setting different product prices may be assigned to different
segments of the population in various ways. In most of the related papers the segment structure –
the (typically finite) set of types and the prior distribution over this set, is known in advance. The
seller and consumers then compete for the informational rents. The crux of the seller’s challenge
is to minimize the informational rents of consumers by providing a price menu such that each
type self selects to a price in a way that maximizes profits. In particular, from the outset the
firm knows the finite set of types and the proportion of the population associated with each type.
Hence, deciding on the segments is superfluous. An exception is the work by [3] where the authors
consider a model of asymmetric information on consumers’ willingness to pay for the good (see
also [46] for further discussion along these lines). In their two stage model, consumers are offered
a single price for the good which they can accept or reject. In a second stage differential prices
are offered based on the reaction to the initial price (as recorded by a cookie in an online shopping
setting). Thus, in the first stage the seller collects information in addition to generating revenues.
This work considers a finite and single dimensional type model (two types actually) and a common
prior. In particular the common prior assumption of [3] implies that some study on the population
has already been conducted in some a-priori stage (which they do not model). More generally, the
common prior assumption is not well-suited for studying primal settings where nothing is known.
In contrast, we focus on a prior-free type space. This captures a situation where (almost) noth-
ing is known about the consumers, and the segmentation process is done over a clean slate. In
addition, we assume that the number of possible types is substantially larger than the number of
consumers and definitely larger than the number of segments the seller can handle. This assump-
tion also allows us to model primal settings where nothing is known about the consumers. It also
complicates the challenge. To demonstrate why this makes the segmentation challenge more com-
plex consider the complete information version of the two models, ours and that in [3]. In [3], the
number of prices equals the number of types which is just the number of segments. Thus, each
segment is offered his maximal willingness to pay. In contrast, even with complete information,
the seller is left with the complex task of optimal segmentation (or clustering as often termed in
other disciplines).
On another aspect, our segmentation challenge is simpler. Whereas the differential pricing
models put the consumer and seller with opposite interests, our model focuses on some abstract
fitness between goods and segments and so interests are much more aligned.
The economics literature on marketing strategies (beyond pricing) is somewhat limited. One
such work is Johnson and Myatt [27]. They provide a framework for analyzing transformations
of demand and use it to study a monopolist’s optimal advertising and marketing strategy. They
consider a monopolist with either a single product or a a given set of differentiated product variants.
The theoretical literature in economics that studies segmentation and related product differen-
tiation dates back to the seminal paper of Harold Hotelling [24]. In Hotelling’s setting the firms
compete on location and each firm wants to maximize the size of the segment of consumers which
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it attracts. Hotelling and others show that in some cases the competition results in product ho-
mogeneity while under other assumptions significant product differentiation is observed. In this
work, as well in a large body of follow up literature on ‘spatial economics’, the consumers hold
no private information and do not play a strategic role, whereas the emphasis is on the strategic
interaction among firms and how this is related to profitability. In particular, almost no attention
was given in the body of work on spatial economics to consumers’ overall welfare. One exception
is Lancaster [30] who studies the social welfare implications of product differentiation instead of
the firms’ profitability, which drive preceding literature.
More recently, the question of optimal multiple facility location was studied from the point of
view of a social planner who can dictate the location of such facilities. In this mechanism design
challenge it is the consumers who have private information and do play a strategic role. A central
planner asks agents (consumers) to report their location (which is private information) and then
dictates the location of a set of K facilities. The objective function of the planer is to minimize the
distance agents have to travel to the nearest facility. To recast the facility location to the segmen-
tation jargon one can think of the set players that utilize a certain facility as segment. Therefore,
determining the K locations for the facilities induces a segmentation, where the facilities serve
as ‘centroids’. Note that in the facility location framework it is assumed that once facilities are
located each agent may decide to use any of the K facilities and not necessarily the one closest to
the position he primarily announced. In contrast, the segmentation challenge allows for the plan-
ner to dictate not only the location of the ‘centroids’ but also which centroid —(or segment) each
consumer is associated with. This turns out to be a significant component for obtaining positive
results. In fact, work on multiple facility location turned out to be challenging [31, 19], and despite
the interesting results obtained, these could not address the challenge of (approximately) optimiz-
ing expected social welfare. In contrast, the segmentation challenge is surmountable as we shall
demonstrate. A preliminary discussion of the facility location in the context of such a dictatorial
planner appears in our earlier work [35], which only discusses a ‘linear’ setting with a finite state
space.
Segmentation and incentives have already been studied in the past in the context of Hedonic
games. In such games players have a preference relation over the set of coalitions they would like to
be part of. A segmentation is Nash-stable if no player would like to deviate from its current segment
to another one. Players’ underlying preference on segments may be arbitrary or may be derived
from some proximity (similarity) between players, as in our context. Additional stability notions
such as core stability have also been studied (see [6, 9, 10], among others). While the spirit of our
model has some similarity with the above, our model and approach are vastly different. Central
to our motivation and model is the role of the mechanism designer who has his own objective
function, independent of players’ preferences. Such a designer is not part of the hedonic game
model.6 Another distinction between the literature on hedonic games and our work is that the
former was mostly studied in the context of complete information whereas we study segmentation
with incomplete information.
6Although these games have not been studied in the context of mechanism design the social welfare implications
of equilibrium have been. In particular [18] study the price of anarchy in such games.
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Market segmentation is also a central topic in within the disciplines of marketing, machine
learning and optimization. However, in this body of work the consumer either has no private
information or, if he does, is assumed to act in a non-strategic way and truthfully discloses his
private information.
The first academic treatment of market segmentation, to the best of out knowledge, took place
in the middle of 1950s by Wendell Smith [41]. In his work Smith advocates market segmenta-
tion being an important tool to enable marketers to better meet customer needs. He views it as
development of the demand side of the market that represents a rational and more precise adjust-
ment of product and marketing effort to consumer or user. Much of the literature that evolved
from Smith’s original work was about the parameters and families of parameters according to
which segmentation should be done. In fact, by and large, four segmentation bases have been
recognized throughout the years in the marketing literature (see [29]): geographic segmentation,
demographic segmentation, psychographic segmentation, and behavioral segmentation. The seg-
mentation base chosen to subdivide a market will depend on many factors such as the type of
product, the nature of demand, the method of distribution, the media available for market com-
munication, and buyers’ motivation [13]. The marketing methods discussed in this literature, and
in particular segmentation methods (see a discussion of methods of segmentation in [20]), almost
entirely ignore game-theoretic considerations on the part of consumers. Thus, the available data
underlying segmentation is (implicitly) considered truthful. Specific major challenges tackled by
market segmentation research are the identification of variables that are crucial for segmentation
(e.g., is socio-economic status a good attribute? [7]), in addition to statistical approaches (e.g., [5])
and the development of general methodologies for market segmentation as part of the “marketing
mix” (see, e.g., [47]).
In contrast, the optimization and machine learning communities, have focused their efforts on
understanding the algorithmic and statistical challenges underlying segmentation. The segmenta-
tion challenge is known as the k-median problem in the theory of optimization and as the study
of ‘centroids’ in the Machine Learning community. A large set of n points in an arbitrary metric
space is given. The challenge is to efficiently identify a subset of k points in a way that the sum
of distances of points from their closest centroid, respectively, is minimized (see, e.g., [12]). A
related problem is the k-center problem in which the aim is to minimize the maximal distance over
all distances from the selected centroids (see, e.g., [23]). Notice that such a selection of centroids
(plus some tie-breaking rule) naturally induces a partitioning/segmentation of the points.
In the above literature it is taken for granted that the underlying data set is truthful and has not
been manipulated. Thus, consumers incentives and possible strategic behavior is ignored. Hypo-
thetically, were such incentives accounted for, many of the results and algorithmic achievements
could fail.
The current paper falls within the larger framework of approximate mechanism design without
monetary transfers initiated by [37]. From a technical perspective we adopt and generalize on the
ideas presented in our earlier work [35, 34] where we introduce approximate mechanism design
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without money in a setting where the set of types as well as the set of social alternatives is finite,
as opposed to the current work. In the finite case we were able to leverage the natural lower bound
over the difference between a user’s utility for two distinct outcomes. This lower bound does not
hold when the set of outcomes is a continuum, as we naturally have in our segmentation problem.
Instead, we design an oblivious mechanism that is “strongly incentive compatible” in the sense that
the loss from misreporting depends quadratically in how much the user misreports. As a result,
the incentive compatibility notion we work with is that of undominated strategies, as opposed
to the more prevalent one of ex-post Nash equilibrium strategies used in [35]. Obviously the
set of strategy tuples we consider in the current work (those surviving a single elimination stage
of dominated strategies) contains the set of all strategy tuples that form an equilibrium. Hence,
implementation in undominated strategies is more robust. Note, in particular, it relies on players’
rationality but does does not rely on players knowing others are rational. The reason we can
push the techniques further is due to the focus on a narrow design problem, which we argue is
economically important, as opposed to our previous work which addressed more abstract settings.
Our earlier work [35, 34] leveraged the concept of differential privacy [16], and the recently
established connection between differential privacy and mechanism design. Differential privacy is
a definition of privacy that has emerged in the computer-science literature on foundations of data
analysis. In a differentially private mechanism, every agent’s influence on the outcome distribution
is bounded in the sense that by changing its input the agent can influence the probability of each
outcome by at most a factor of 1 + . McSherry and Talwar proposed in their seminal work [33]
that differential privacy can be used as a tool for mechanism design, a proposition that was further
developed in our work [35].7 One particular paper worth mentioning is [14] who study a two
stage model where the consumption behavior in the first stage effects the segment the consumer
is associated with in the second stage, where the segmentation is used for targeted advertising.
The paper then investigates the effect of the level of privacy protection (manifested in the privacy
parameter of differential privacy ) chosen at stage one (which is thought of as the result of some
privacy regulation) over the equilibrium behavior. The authors show that introducing privacy leads
to non intuitive phenomena. For example, a higher level of privacy can entail more information
disclosure on the consumer’s type.
Last but not least, our work adds to the body of work on virtual implementation, and in particu-
lar robust virtual implementation. In many settings implementation is known to be impossible and
so researchers have suggested less challenging, yet meaningful replacements to implementation.
One such avenue of research is that of virtual implementation, where the challenge of implement-
ing a function is replaced with implementing an -approximation of that function, as we do here.
This line of work initially focused on implementation in complete information environments (see
Matsushima [32] and Abreu and Sen [2]), later extended to private information settings (e.g., to
Abreu and Matsushima [1], Duggan [15], and Serrano and Vohra [39, 40] ) and more recently to
private information settings without a common prior as we do here (see Bergemann and Morris
[8]).
7For more on the connection between privacy and mechanism design we suggest the review by Heffetz and Ligett
[22], a survey by Pai and Roth [36].
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2 Model
LetN be a set ofN consumers where each consumer is associated with a point in the I dimensional
cube, T = [0, 1]I . Thus, consumer n is described by the vector tn ∈ T of his attributes. The vector
tn is the n-th consumer’s private information.
A firm would like to advertise its products on-line to this audience in such a way that consumers
observing the ad will click on it and would be re-directed to the firm’s on-line shop. Thus, the
firm would like to generate a campaign that maximizes the click-through-rate (CTR). Ideally the
firm would tailor the advertisement to each consumer based on his on-line footprint and all the
accumulated data (tn ∈ T in our model). Realistically this is impossible and firms can only
generate a limited number of advertisement variants. Let us denote this (exogenously given) bound
by K. How should a firm partition the set of consumers and what is the optimal variant for each
segment? This is the (mechanism) design challenge we are interested in.
We assume that the firm has the ability to identify the optimal advertisement (highest CTR)
from the set of all possible variants for any given consumer, t ∈ T . Thus, we can actually identify
an ad variant as a point in T as well, where variant t actually refers to the advertisement targeted
ideally at consumer t.
We will further assume that the further away a consumer is from t the less likely he is to click
the ad t. To formalize this let |t− t′| denote the l1 distance between any two types of consumers, t
and t′ (or between a consumer type and an ad variant).8 The range of values of |t− t′| is therefore
[0, I]. Let P : [0, I]→ [0, 1] be an arbitrary decreasing function. P (|t− t′|) denotes the CTR, i.e.,
the probability that a consumer of type t will click on an ad that is designed for type t′. We assume
P is a Lipschitz function and so there exists some B > 0 such that
B · |x− x′| ≥ |P (x)− P (x′)| for all x, x′ ∈ [0, I].
One way to interpret this assumption is that consumers exhibit some tolerance to product variants
which do not match them perfectly. A high value of B corresponds to low tolerance while a low
value corresponds to high tolerance.9
The segmentation challenge. Consumers report their attribute vector and then, in turn, the firm
chooses (up to) K points in T so as to maximize the CTR. The consumers, aware of the segmen-
tation scheme, might be strategic about what they report.
Formally, the set of alternatives available to the firm (choosing K variants) is S = TK . For
each s = (sk)Kk=1 ∈ S and for any tn ∈ T let Q(tn, s) ∈ argminsk |sk − tn| denote an option
8Formally, if x ∈ IRI then |x| =∑Ii=1 |xi|. Note that |x| ∈ [0, I] for x ∈ [0, 1]I .
9The model can be generalized so that the probability function P can be different for different consumers. Let us
denote by Pn the probability function corresponding to consumer n and byBn the corresponding Lipschitz coefficient.
Our results extend to this setting once we set B = maxnBn.
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closest to tn in s.10 A vector t = (tn)Nn=1 ∈ TN and a choice of s ∈ SK of K ad variants induces
the vector of probabilities
{P (|tn −Q(tn, s)|)}Nn=1 ∈ [0, 1]N .
The goal of the mechanism is to choose some s ∈ S in order to maximize the average CTR which
is defined as
F (t, s) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
P (|tn −Q(tn, s)|) .
A consumer’s utility is a function of the product suitability. Consumers view advertisements
that are tailored for them as informative while other advertisements can be regarded as spam.
Formally, the utility of a consumer of type t when exposed to an advertisement tailored to type t′
is u(t, t′) = V (|t − t′|), where V : [0, I] → [0, 1] is an arbitrary decreasing function calibrated so
that V (0) = 1. We assume that there exists some c > 0 such that
c · |x− x′| ≤ |V (x)− V (x′)| for all x, x′ ∈ [0, I].
The coefficient c captures the ‘intolerance to spam’ of consumers.11
Note that in our model both the consumer’s utility and the firm’s utility decrease the further
away the true type of the consumer is from the assigned advertisement. Apart from this common
feature we assume no other common ground between these two.
Mechanisms. Let ∆ = ∆(S) be the set of all probability distributions over (S,B), where B is
standard Borel σ-field over S = TK , which is just the I ·K- dimensional unit cube . A (random)
mechanism is a function M : TN → ∆. Given a vector of consumer types, t ∈ TN , a vector
b ∈ TN of announcements and a mechanism M we denote by
UnM(t
n, b) = Es∼M(b)(u(tn, Q(bn, s))) = Es∼M(b)V (|tn −Q(bn, s)|)
the expected utility of consumer n and by
FM(t, b) = Es∼M(b)(F (t, s)) = Eσ∼M(b)
1
N
N∑
n=1
P (|tn −Q(tn, s)|)
the expected CTR, where s is randomly drawn according to M(b) ∈ ∆.
10In case there is more than one such option we take an arbitrary tie breaking rule such as choosing the one with the
smaller index. This tie breaking rule is without loss of generality.
11The model can be generalized so that the spam function V can be different for different consumers. Let us
denote by V n the probability function corresponding to consumer n and by cn the corresponding intolerance to spam
coefficient. Our results extend to this setting once we set c = minn cn. Our scheme does not rely on designer’s
familiarity with the specific structure of the functions V n besides knowing the coefficient c (or at least some reasonable
lower bound on it).
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Implementation in undominated strategies. A (pure) strategy for player n is a function fn :
T → T that maps n’s type into an announced type (announcement). Let f = (fn)Nn=1 denote
a vector of strategies. The strategy fn is weakly dominated if there exists some strategy gn
such that for any strategy tuple, f−n, of the other players and for any t ∈ TN , UnM(tn, f(t)) ≤
UnM(t
n, (gn, f−n)(t)), with at least one of the inequalities being strict. If fn is not weakly domi-
nated we refer to it as undominated.
The solution concept is that of undominated strategies which assumes very little in the way of
players’ rationality, yet is adequate for prior-free environments. We say that M η-implements F in
undominated strategies if for any vector of types, t ∈ TN and any tuple of undominated strategies,
f ,
FM(t, f(t)) ≥ max
s∈S
F (t, s)− η.
2.1 Road map of results
The rest of Section 2 is devoted to the construction of the segmentation mechanism. Before we
dive into the technicalities let us provide the intuition behind our construction. Our mechanism is a
convex combinations of two direct mechanisms, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, such
that when properly combined yield the desired result.
The first of the two is the quantal response mechanism. This mechanism has two interesting
properties. On the one hand if players are almost truthful then the mechanism outputs a social
outcome that is nearly optimal for a large enough population (see Theorems 1,2). On the other
hand, although players need not be truthful there is a bound on the gain from misreporting and this
bound is linear in the amount of misreporting (Theorem 3) .
The second mechanism is an oblivious mechanism which trivially induces truth telling. More
so, the loss from misreporting in the mechanism is at least quadratic in the amount misreporting
(Lemma 1). The main weakness of the oblivious mechanism is that it can be arbitrarily inefficient.
By properly combining the two mechanisms we get a mechanism where players will not lie
by too much about their type (recall the linear upper bound on the gain of the first mechanism vs.
the quadratic lower bound on the loss in the second). In addition, for a large enough population
the proper combination will put a low enough weight on the oblivious component and hence the
efficiency of the mechanism will be almost entirely derived from that of the quantal response
mechanism, which we already know to be almost optimal.
2.2 A Quantal Response Mechanism
A quantal response mechanism is a mechanism which assigns higher probabilities to better so-
cial alternatives, for a given vector of announcements. One particular family of quantal response
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mechanisms, {M :  > 0}, is defined as follows. Let λ denote the Lebesgue measure over the unit
interval. For any S¯ ⊂ S such that S¯ is in the σ-field B we set:
M(t)(S¯) =
∫
S¯
en(F (t,s))dλ(s)∫
S
en(F (t,s))dλ(s)
. (1)
Such a mechanism has previously been introduced by McSherry and Talwar [33] in the context
of privacy preserving mechanisms. In their work McSherry and Talwar refer to it as the expo-
nential mechanism and demonstrate its properties in the context of mechanism design. We later
leverage the results of McSherry and Talwar to show that the mechanism we eventually propose
has desirable privacy preserving properties (Section 4). Further connections between the exponen-
tial mechanism and mechanism design is also the subject of Nissim, Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz
[35], Nissim, Orlandi, and Smorodinsky [34] and Huang and Kannan [25]. We note that the set-
ting of Huang and Kannan differs from ours as their mechanism uses monetary transfers which we
avoid.
We now turn to argue that exponential mechanisms have two notable properties. First, devia-
tions from truthfulness can offer very limited gain to a deviating player. Second, small deviations
from truthfulness induce an almost optimal outcome. We begin with a formal statement of the
latter observation. In fact, whenever players are truthful, the following holds:
Theorem 1 ([33]) For any t ∈ TN , FM(t, t) ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 3N ln
(
e+ (N)K+1
)
.
Theorem 1 states that if all consumers are truthful then the exponential mechanism with param-
eter  would induce a potentially sub optimal outcome. However the expected decrease in social
welfare, compared with the first best option, would be of the order of magnitude of K ln(N)
N
, which
diminishes to zero as N increases, keeping  and K fixed. (Later we will set  to be a function of
N , but keep N increasing with N so as to keep K ln(N)
N
diminishing overall.)
The limited sub-optimality resulting from truthful reporting can further deteriorate if players
are not truthful, however this further deterioration is also bounded. The new bound takes into
account the Lipschitz coefficients, B and c, previously introduced. In order to save on notation we
assume, in what follows, that without loss of generality c = 1
B
(otherwise set B = max{B, 1
c
}):
Theorem 2 Let β ≥ 0. If ∀n |bn−tn| ≤ β thenFM(t, b) ≥ maxs F (t, s)−2Bβ− 3N ln
(
e+ (N)K+1
)
.
The proof of Theorem 2 is deferred to the appendix.
In words, Theorem 2 states that if consumers mis-report their information by (at most) β then
the bound on the efficiency loss of the exponential mechanism is of the order of magnitude of
Bβ + K ln(N)
N
.
The next theorem provides an upper bound on the gain of a consumer by misreporting her true
type to the quantal response mechanisms:
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Theorem 3 If  ≤ B
2I
then for any n, any bn, tn ∈ T and any b−n ∈ TN−1,
UnM(t
n, (bn, b−n)) ≤ UnM(tn, (tn, b−n)) + 4B|tn − bn|.12
The proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to the appendix.
Thus, a consumer may gain by reporting bn when his true type is tn. However, this gain is
bounded by 4B|tn − bn|, regardless of what other consumers report.
2.3 An Oblivious Mechanism
An oblivious mechanism is a mechanism that chooses the K segments while ignoring consumers’
announcements. The only use made of consumer announcements is to assign each consumer to a
specific segment, once such K segments have been chosen. Therefore if the mechanism assigns
each consumer to the segment that is optimal vis-a-vis their announcement then it must be incentive
compatible.
The specific oblivious mechanism we have in mind is one which chooses only two points in
the space T which value differs only on one coordinate, i ∈ I . For all other I − 1 coordinates
the values of both products are set to zero. The two distinct values are chosen uniformly in [0, 1],
but are restricted to a grid, with step size x, over the interval. In fact, we consider a randomized
version of this, where the choice of coordinate i and the grid step size x are randomly chosen.
In more detail, we study a family of (random) oblivious incentive compatible mechanisms,
parameterized by a positive integer m¯. These oblivious mechanisms choose two products which
are two random neighbors in some grid on T = [0, 1]I . The grid step-size is I2X , where X is
chosen at random. Once a grid is given the two products are chosen such that all I attributes
are assigned the value zero, except for a single random attribute chosen randomly and uniformly
from {1, . . . , I}. The value of this remaining attribute for the two neighboring products is chosen
uniformly from all corresponding points on the grid. We provide a formal construction below.
First, let X be a random variable which takes on values in X ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , m¯} according to a
uniform distribution. Let Iˆ be another random variable that takes values in {1, . . . , I} according to
a uniform distribution and let gˆ be a third random variable that takes values in {1, 2, . . . , I2X − 1}
according to a uniform distribution. Now set β = β(X, Iˆ, gˆ) = (~0−Iˆ ,
gˆ
I2X
) and γ = γ(X, Iˆ, gˆ) =
(~0−Iˆ ,
gˆ+1
I2X
). Note that, conditional on X , β is chosen uniformly from a set of size I22X .
Given a realization of the three random variables X, Iˆ, gˆ the oblivious mechanism chooses the
social alternative s = s(β, γ) = s(β(X, Iˆ, gˆ), γ(X, Iˆ, gˆ)) where it produces the optimal advertise-
ments for types β and (K-1 copies of) γ.
12Recall that B is the Lipschitz coefficient of the click probability function and the consumers’ utility function.
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We denote this mechanism by M (obl m¯).
It is easy to verify that an oblivious mechanism is necessarily truthful. However, this specific
mechanism yields a lower bound on the utility loss from mis-reporting:
Lemma 1 If |bn − tn| ≥ 2−(m¯−1) then Un
M(obl m¯)
(tn, t) ≥ Un
M(obl m¯)
(tn, (bn, t−n)) + ‖t
n−bn‖21
m¯8I2B
.
The proof of Lemma 1 is deferred to the appendix. To intuit the construction, consider the one
dimensional case (I = 1). Agent n loses in utility when it is assigned to the advertisement in {β, γ}
that is farther from tn. In particular, when tn ≤ β and bn ≥ γ (or bn ≤ β and tn ≥ γ) the agent
loss in utility is γ − β. To maximize the expectation from this kind of utility loss, the mechanism
designer wishes to set γ − β to be of the same magnitude as |tn − bn|. The designer, however,
does not know |tn − bn|, and furthermore, the magnitude of deviation may differ among agents.
Choosing γ − β according to an exponential scale addresses these two issues simultaneously as
for every agent with |bn − tn| ≥ 2−(m¯−1), the chances of selecting the scale that approximately
maximizes her expected utility loss is at least 1/m¯.
3 Main Result - Implementation in undominated strategies
Given a parameter 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 let Mq,,m¯ = (1 − q)M + qM (obl m¯) be the random mechanism
resulting from flipping a (q, 1− q) biased coin and resorting to the oblivious mechanism, M (obl m¯),
in one case and to the quantal response mechanism, M, in the other case.13
Note that as q tends to one the mechanism essentially becomes incentive compatible while
terribly inefficient. On the other hand for low values of q we may lose incentive compatibility
but gain efficiency. In a similar way, small values of  imply more incentive compatibility while
inducing less efficiency. In what follows we pursue some ‘golden path’ and determine the value
of the parameters of the mechanism such that we have both incentive compatibility and (almost)
efficiency.
Given a population size N , an attribute space of dimension I and the segmentation parameter
K we set  = 1
N2/3
, m¯ = dlog2
(
N1/3
lnN
)
e (where dxe denotes the smallest integer greater or equal
x), and q = 32B2I2m¯2m¯. Denote by Mˆ = Mˆ(N,K) = Mq,,m¯ the mechanism resulting from
this choice of parameters.
Our main result is:
13An alternative mechanism is to compute the segmentation for both M and M (obl m¯) resulting in two segments
for each consumer (K + 2 segments overall). Then, for each consumer separately and independently, flip a (q, 1− q)
coin in order to determine which of the two segments to apply. The advantage is that the variance in the objective
is reduced, as we never end up with an arbitrary segment for all consumers at once. The disadvantage is that this
mechanism is somewhat wastful in the number of segments, which is K + 2 instead of K. Our main result holds for
this alternative mechanism as well.
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Theorem 4 For any I,K there exists κ = κ(I,K) and N0 such that Mˆ κ lnNN1/3 -implements F in
undominated strategies for all N > N0.
In particular κ = (32B2I2 + 2 + 3(K + 2)), where B is the Lipschitz coefficient of the func-
tion P .
Proof of Theorem 4:
Observe that for any I and K there exists Nq = Nq(I,K) such that q < 1 for all N > Nq and
hence the mechanism is well defined.
Now assume i reports bi such that |bi−ti| ≥ 2−(m¯−1). Therefore, given the choice of parameters
q |t
i−bi|
m¯I222I+3
≥ 4B. Applying Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 we deduce that:
Un
Mˆ
(ti, t)− Un
Mˆ
(ti, (bi, t−i)) =
(1− q) [UnM(ti, t)− UnM(ti, (bi, t−i))] + q [UnM(obl m¯)(ti, t)− UnM(obl m¯)(ti, (bi, t−i))] ≥
−(1− q)4B|ti − bi|+ q‖t
n − bn‖21
m¯8I2B
≥ q‖t
n − bn‖21
m¯8I2B
− 4B|ti − bi|
Replacing with q = 32B2I2m¯2m¯:
Un
Mˆ
(ti, t)− Un
Mˆ
(ti, (bi, t−i)) ≥ 32B
2I2m¯2m¯|ti − bi|2
m¯8I2B
− 4B|ti − bi| =
= 4B2m¯|ti − bi|2 − 4B|ti − bi| = 4B|ti − bi| (2m¯|ti − bi| − 1) > 0.
In words, truthfulness dominates any strategy where |bi−ti| ≥ 2−(m¯−1). Therefore, we analyze
the outcome of the mechanism when all consumers comply with the requirement |bi−ti| < 2−(m¯−1)
There exists some integer Nα = Nα(I,K) such that 2N ln
(
e+ (N)K+1
) ≤ 0.5 for all N >
Nα as required in the proof of Theorem 1. In addition, there exists Nm¯ = Nm¯(I,K) such that
m¯ ≤ lnN for all N > Nm¯. Hereinafter we assume that N > max(Nq, Nα, Nm¯).
There are two sources for the sub-optimality of Mˆ :
1. As the CTR is bounded between 0 and 1, the introduction of an oblivious mechanism with
probability q introduces an expected additive error of at most q = 32B2I2m¯2m¯. Noting that
2m¯ ≤ N1/3
lnN
and substituting for  we get that q ≤ 32B2I2 1
N2/3
m¯N
1/3
lnN
. Recall that m¯ ≤ lnN
and so q ≤ 32B2I2
N1/3
≤ 32B2I2lnN
N1/3
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2. By Theorem 2 the quantal response mechanism introduces an additive error of
B
2(m¯−1)
+
3
N
ln
(
e+ (N)K+1
)
.
We consider each of the two additive errors:
(a) As for the first factor, note that 2m¯−1 = 1
2
· 2m¯ ≥ 1
2
·
(
N1/3
lnN
)
which implies that this
factor error is bounded by 2 lnN
N1/3
.
(b) Note that the second factor, 3
N
ln
(
e+ (N)K+1
) ≤ 3(K+2)
N
ln (N) and substituting
for , we get that there exists N1 = N1(K) such that for all N > N1 this additive error
is bounded by 3(K+2)
N1/3
lnN .
Setting N0 = max(Nq, Nα, Nm¯, N1), we get that for all N > N0 the total additive error is
bounded by (
32B2I2 + 2 + 3(K + 2)
) lnN
N1/3
QED
One criticism of the proposed mechanism is that it hinges on the exponential mechanism, which
is computationally demanding.14
Note, however, that any mechanism that satisfies Theorems 1,2,3 could successfully replace the
exponential mechanism. Theretofore, if future work will lead to the discovery of such a mechanism
then it could easily replace the exponential mechanism (perhaps with an appropriate change in the
constants that refer to the accuracy and the population size). In that sense our main result can be
reinterpreted as a black-box reduction that can be applied to any differentially private mechanism
for the segmentation problem to get the desirable incentive properties.
4 Privacy Issues
Privacy has emerged in the recent years as a public concern in markets where personal information
is gathered and used for commercial goals in general and segmentation in particular. The concerns
14For some settings of the objective function F , sampling from the exponential mechanism amounts to breaking
cryptographic assumptions. An example is when the exponential mechanism is used in an implementation of (differ-
entially private) data release [17, 43, 44]. It is not known whether this applies also to the current setting of F and so
the question of a computationally efficient implementation of our mechanism is open. Attempts to sample from the
exponential mechanism include the use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling as in [11]. A subtle issue
with this approach is that while the MCMC converges to the distribution of the exponential mechanism and hence
satisfies differential privacy ‘in the limit’, it is only approximate and potentially not satisfying differential privacy if
the MCMC is run for only a finite number of steps.
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around privacy refer to the way personal data is saved, who has access to it, how it can be used
in future interactions and whether or not it is forwarded to additional entities. Most of these
concerns are either handled using legal tools or cryptographic tools. However, there is one aspect
of privacy which can be treated neither with legal nor with cryptographic tools. As the outcome of
the mechanism (in particular the segments in our setting) is made public, one could argue that this
information could be used to derive some of the private input provided by the consumers and hence
jeopardize privacy. This concern can only be addressed through the design of the mechanism. That
is, the mechanism should be constructed in a way that makes it difficult to reverse engineer and
individual data from the public outcome.
To be more specific the concern is that even if consumers’ personal data is kept confidential
and the communication channels between the consumers and the mechanism are encrypted, one
may still learn something about individuals just from observing the outcome of the mechanism. In
particular, in our setting, by observing the choice of K segments one may deduce something about
the private information of some consumers. Thus, privacy should be carefully thought of when
designing mechanisms.
How should one account for the privacy loss of a mechanism? In particular, for any given
customer what is the privacy loss she faces? Conceptually, to ensure privacy, one should design
the mechanism so that no individual input has an observable impact on the mechanism’s outcome.
In other words, if one compares the two outcomes of the mechanism: that which is derived from all
the data, the specific customer’s data included, and that which is derived from the same data, absent
the specific customer’s data, then the gap should be minute. In this section we focus on a particular
methodology to account for privacy and the aforementioned gap. For this specific methodology
we argue that the mechanism provided complies with privacy constraints.
Differential privacy: The specific methodology we adopt for accounting for privacy is one
that has been developed over the course of the last decade in the theoretical literature of computer
science and is known as differential privacy. We adopt this methodology as it the current academic
best practice used for defining privacy. Differential privacy, due to Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and
Smith [16]. is formalized as follows:
Let M : TN → ∆(S) be a mechanism. For t ∈ TN and a measurable set Sˆ ⊂ S we
denote by M(t)(Sˆ) the probability that M(t) chooses some vector of K segments in Sˆ. A pair
of type vectors, t, tˆ in TN , are called neighbors if they differ on a single coordinate. Formally,
|{i : ti = tˆi}| = N − 1.
Definition 1 ([16]) M provides -differential privacy if for any measurable Sˆ ⊂ S, any pair of
neighbors t, tˆ ∈ TN , M(t)(Sˆ) ≤ e ·M(tˆ)(Sˆ).
This inspires the following:
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Definition 2 The privacy score of a mechanism M : TN → ∆(S) is ρ(M) = max ln M(t)(Sˆ)
M(tˆ)(Sˆ)
,
where the maximum is taken over all measurable set Sˆ ⊂ S and all neighbors t, tˆ ∈ TN .
We draw the reader’s attention to the following: (1) The higher the score the less privacy is
preserved. (2) The above definition works in our non-Bayesian setting, where no prior over the
vector of types is specified. (3) A worst-case spirit underlies this definition. Thus, if we can
guarantee a low privacy score with such a worst-case definition then we can do so for alternative
scores. Indeed, the following theorem provides an upper bound on the privacy score that diminishes
to zero with the size of the population.
Let us consider the privacy score of the mechanism we propose in our main Theorem:
Theorem 5 The privacy score of the mechanism Mˆ satisfies ρ(Mˆ) ≤ 2
N2/3
.
The proof of Theorem 5 hinges on the following observation (which proof is straightforward
and is omitted):
Lemma 2 Assume mechanismMi has a privacy score of i and let M = αM1 +(1−α)M2, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then ρ(M) ≤ maxi i.
Proof of Theorem 5: Recall that Mˆ combines an exponential mechanism,M, and an oblivious
mechanism. McSherry and Talwar [33] show that ρ(M) ≤ 2. Recall that  = 1n2/3 in our case
and so ρ(M) ≤ 2n2/3 . The oblivious mechanism ignores players’ inputs and so has a privacy score
of zero. Now invoke Lemma 2 to finalize the proof.
QED
At this point a disclaimer is clearly due. The actual segmentation mechanism does more then
produce a desired set of segments. It also allocates each customer to one such segment. If such
allocation is publicly announced then our analysis on privacy is clearly flawed as the associated
segment provides valuable information on the customer’s input. Therefore the above analysis
hinges on the assumption that each customer is discreetly associated with a segment. Clearly,
without this assumption privacy cannot be guaranteed.15
15The notion of Joint differential privacy, see [28], captures privacy considerations in such cases.
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5 Can the Mechanism be Simplified?
One desirable property of mechanisms is simplicity. A simple mechanism implies that participants
have an easy time understanding the ‘rules of the game’. We do not pursue a formal notion of sim-
plicity however we admit that the proposed mechanism is not simple but is rather complex. The
mechanism is composed in a very specific way from two more primitive mechanisms, of which one
- the quantal response mechanism - is quite complex in its own right. A valid concern about com-
plex mechanisms in general and ours in particular is whether they may deter participation. Thus,
it would have been nice to achieve similar efficiency and privacy results in a simpler mechanism.
One could argue that as we focus on large populations, individuals are likely to be non influ-
ential and so eliciting the true information should be straightforward and is possible without the
complexity we introduce. It is beyond our knowledge to argue that this intuition is generally in-
correct, however we demonstrate it is a problematic argument via an analysis of the following two
natural simplifications of our mechanism:
• Variant 1 - Our proposed mechanism randomizes between a quantal response mechanism
and an oblivious one, where the probability of the latter, q = q(N), diminishes as the popu-
lation size, N, grows. In variant 1 we maintain such a randomization but replace the quantal
response mechanism with a mechanism that produces the naive first best outcome (assigns
probability one to the optimal segmentation).
• Variant 2 - A variant which only uses the quantal response mechanism and ignores the
oblivious mechanism.
Unfortunately, neither of these two variants has the desired properties as we demonstrate below.
A counterexample for Variant 1: In the next example we provide an equilibrium for the ‘seg-
mentation game’ with complete information derived from variant 1 of our mechanism. In this
equilibrium a fixed proportion of the consumers are not truthful and consequently the segmenta-
tion is sub-optimal. Furthermore the gap from optimality does not diminish as the population size
grows.
Example 1 Let K = 2 and assume the consumer’s satisfaction and the CTR diminish at a rate of
V (x) = P (x) = x2, where x is the deviation from truthfulness. Let the set of possible types be
single dimensional (I = 1) and consider the scenario with 12N consumers, of which N are of type
t = 0, N of type t = 0.6 and 10N of type t = 1. We assume, without loss of generality, that if there
is more than a single optimal segmentation given players’ announcements, then the tie breaking
rule will choose for minimize the lower end product.
Consider the following vector of announcements: Consumers with extreme types (t = 0, 1)
announce truthfully whereas consumers with type t = 0.6 announce y. It turns out that if y
solves the equation ( y
1−y )
2 = 20
11
then the following two segmentations are optimal vis-a-vis the
announcements:
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1. Set s1 = y
2
, s2 = 1 and lump the 2N consumers with types t = 0, 0.6 around the first product.
2. Set s1 = 0, s2 = y+10
11
and lump the 11N consumers with types t = 0.6, 1 around the second
product.
The social welfare (CTR) from the first option is N [1−(
y
2
)2]+N [1−( y
2
)2]+10N
12N
whereas the social
welfare from the second option is N+N [1−(y−(
y+10
11
)2]+10N [1−(1− y+10
11
)2]
12N
. Equating these two results in
the equation ( y
1−y )
2 = 20
11
which is how we chose y to begin with.
Given our tie breaking rule the segmentation chosen will be the former
Note that the only potentially profitable deviation by a single player is for a player of type 0.6
to announce a value greater than y. However, any such deviation will result in a segmentation that
is very similar to the latter option. For the true type (t = 0.6) this results in a discontinuous drop
in utility. This discontinuity implies that the vector of announcements forms a Nash equilibrium
for variant 1 when the oblivious mechanism is chosen with a sufficiently small probability.
To finish the example we compute the CTR in equilibrium which is N(1−(
y
2
)2)+N [1−(0.6−( y
2
)2)]+10N
12N
≈
12−0.18
12
and compare it with the optimal CTR which is N+N [1−(
10+0.6
11
−0.6)2]+10N [1−(1− 10+0.6
11
)2]
12N
≈
12−0.1455
12
. This inefficiency gap does not depend on N and in particular does not diminish as the
population size grows.
A counterexample for Variant 2: In the next example we provide an equilibrium for the ‘segmen-
tation game’ with complete information derived from variant 2 of our mechanism. Recall that the
second variant involves dropping the oblivious mechanism and using only the exponential compo-
nent. In the following example the equilibrium involves half the consumers not being truthful. The
resulting segmentation is consequently sub-optimal and the gap from optimality does not diminish
as the population size grows.
Example 2 Let K = 1 and assume the consumer’s satisfaction and the CTR diminish at a rate of
V (x) = P (x) = x2, where x is the deviation from truthfulness. Let the set of possible types be
single dimensional (I = 1) and consider the scenario with 2N consumers, of which N are of type
t = 0 and N of type t = 0.5. The equilibrium (for sufficiently large N ) is for type 0 consumers to
be truthful and for type 0.5 consumers to announce b = 1. We leave it to the reader to verify this is
indeed an equilibrium and that the efficiency loss from optimality is roughly [1−21
4
2
]−[1− 1
2
2
] = 1
8
.
6 Summary
The idea of considering an optimal set of K representative agents may be seen as a contribution to
the development of economic methodology. The use of representative agents, where all customers
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are considered alike a “typical” one, has been central to the economic literature [21]. In contrast,
game theoretic models, which model each and every agent separately may be too challenging.
What we implicitly consider here is a middle ground where a large economy can be modeled vis-
a-vis studying K > 1 representative agents. Instead of ending up with a single economic policy
based on the single representative agent model as in the standard approach, models that deal with
K > 1 representative agents may propose a menu of policies (e.g., tax policies) coupled with a
means for assigning each individual to one of the policies.
7 Appendix - Proofs
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We restate Theorem 1 for convenience:
Theorem 1: For any t ∈ T n, FM(t, t) ≥ maxs F (t, s)− 3n ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
)
.
Before proving the theorem we cite a technical observation due to McSherry and Talwar [33].
To do so we introduce the following notation. For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 let Sα = Sα(t) = {s ∈ S : F (t, s) ≥
maxs F (t, s)− α}, and S¯α = S¯α(t) = S \ Sα.
Let λ denote the Lebesgue measure over [0, 1]IK .
Lemma 3 (McSherry and Talwar [33]) If α ≥ 1
n
ln
(
maxs F (t,s)
αλ(Sα)
)
thenFM(t, t) ≥maxs F (t, s)−
3α.
We include the proof for completeness.
Proof: Note first that
M(t)(S¯2α) ≤ M(t)(S¯2α)
M(t)(Sα)
=
∫
S¯2α
en(F (t,s¯))ds¯∫
Sα
en(F (t,s¯))ds¯
≤
≤
∫
S¯2α
en(maxs F (t,s)−2α)ds¯∫
Sα
en(maxs F (t,s)−α)ds¯
= e−nα · λ(S¯2α)
λ(Sα)
≤ e
−nα
λ(Sα)
,
where the first inequality follows from M(t)(Sα) ≤ 1, the second inequality follows from the
definition of S¯2α and Sα, and the third inequality follows from λ(S¯2α) ≤ 1.
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Recall that α ≥ 1
n
ln
(
maxs F (t,s)
αλ(Sα)
)
, therefore implying e
−nα
λ(Sα)
≤ α
maxs F (t,s)
. Combined with the
previous inequality proves that M(t)(S¯2α) ≤ αmaxs F (t,s) . This, in turn, proves that M(t)(S2α) ≥
1− α
maxs F (t,s)
. In words, M(t) returns s ∈ S2α with probability at least 1− αmaxs F (t,s) .
Hence,
FM(t, t) ≥ (max
s
F (t, s)− 2α)M(S2α) ≥
≥ (max
s
F (t, s)− 2α)(1− α
maxs F (t, s)
) ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 3α,
implying the desired result.
QED
Fix t ∈ T n and let s¯ ∈ argmaxsF (t, s). Let Sˆ = {s ∈ S : |sk − s¯k| ≤ αB}, where B is the
Lipschitz coefficient of the function P .
Lemma 4 Sˆ ⊂ Sα.
Proof: Let sˆ be an arbitrary element of Sˆ and let i be an arbitrary buyer. Assume that Q(ti, s¯)
is s¯k. Then P (|ti−Q(ti, sˆ)|) ≥ P (|ti− sˆk|). In addition P (|ti− s¯k|)−P (|ti− sˆk|) ≤ B(|ti− s¯k|−
|ti − sˆk|) ≤ B|s¯k − sˆk| ≤ α (for the first inequality recall that B is the Lipschitz coefficient of P
while the second inequality follows from the triangle inequality). Therefore, P (|ti − Q(ti, sˆ)|) ≥
P (|ti − s¯k|)− α.
Summing over all consumers, F (t, sˆ) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 P (|ti−Q(ti, sˆ)|) ≥ 1n
∑n
i=1[P (|ti−s¯k|)−α] =
F (t, s¯)− α, which implies sˆ ∈ Sα.
QED
Using Lemmas 3 and 4 we can now prove Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix t ∈ T n, let s¯ ∈ argmaxsF (t, s) and set Sˆ = {s ∈ S : |sk− s¯k| ≤ αB}.
By Lemma 4, Sˆ ⊂ Sα and so λ(Sα) ≥ λ(Sˆ) ≥ (2αB )K .
Set α = 1
n
ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
)
and let nB be large enough such that for any n > nB, 2 ln(e +
(n)K+1) > B. Therefore
2K
(n)K+1
[ln(e+ (n)K+1)]K+1 (e+ (n)K+1) ≥ BK =⇒ 2KαK+1(e+ (n)K+1) ≥ BK =⇒
e+ (n)K+1 ≥ B
K
α(2α)K
=⇒ e+ (n)K+1 ≥ maxs F (t, s)
αλ(Sα)
=⇒
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ln(e+ (n)K+1)
n
≥
ln(maxs F (t,s)
αλ(Sα)
)
n
=⇒ α ≥ 1
n
ln(
maxs F (t, s)
αλ(Sα)
).
Therefore we can apply Lemma 3 and deduce that
FM(t, t) ≥ max
s
F (t, s)− 3α = max
s
F (t, s)− 3
n
ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
)
,
as required.
QED
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 restated: If ∀i |bi−ti| ≤ β then FM(t, b) ≥ maxs F (t, s)−2Bβ− 3n ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
)
Lemma 5 For any s ∈ S and b, t,∈ [0, 1]n,
• |F ((bi, t−i), s)− F ((ti, t−i), s)| ≤ 1
n
B|ti − bi|, and
• |F (b, s)− F (t, s)| ≤ maxiB|ti − bi|.
Proof:
|bi −Q(bi, s)| ≤ |bi −Q(ti, s)| ≤ |bi − ti|+ |ti −Q(ti, s)|.
Thus, implying |bi−Q(bi, s)|−|ti−Q(ti, s)| ≤ |bi−ti|. By a symmetric argument |ti−Q(ti, s)|−
|bi −Q(bi, s)| ≤ |bi − ti|. Therefore:
|F (bi, t−i, s)− F (ti, t−i, s)| = 1
n
P (|ti −Q(ti, s)|)− P (|bi −Q(bi, s)|) ≤
≤ 1
n
B||ti −Q(ti, s)| − |bi −Q(bi, s)|| ≤ 1
n
B|ti − bi|,
proving the first part of the Lemma.
To prove the second part we introduce the notation hi = (b1, . . . , bi, ti+1, . . . tn), i = 1, . . . , n.
From part one we know that |F (hi−1)− F (hi)| ≤ 1
n
B|bi − ti|, and so:
|F (b, s)− F (t, s)| ≤
n∑
i=1
|F (hi−1)− F (hi)| ≤
n∑
i=1
1
n
B|bi − ti| ≤ maxiB|bi − ti|.
QED
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Lemma 6 If |bi − ti| ≤ β for all i then |maxs F (t, s)−maxs F (b, s)| ≤ Bβ.
Proof: Let st ∈ S be the optimal segmentation for the vector t (formally, F (t, st) ≥ F (t, s) ∀s ∈
S) and similarly let sb ∈ S be the optimal segmentation for the vector b. (F (b, sb) ≥ F (b, s) ∀s ∈
S). The inequality |ti −Q(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti −Q(ti, sb)| follows from the definition of the function Q.
Invoking the triangle inequality:
|ti − bi|+ |bi −Q(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti −Q(bi, sb)| ≥ |ti −Q(ti, sb)|.
In the same vein |bi −Q(ti, sb)| ≥ |bi −Q(bi, sb)| and so
|ti − bi|+ |ti −Q(ti, sb)| ≥ |bi −Q(ti, sb)| ≥ |bi −Q(bi, sb)|.
Combining these 2 inequalities:
||ti −Q(ti, sb)| − |bi −Q(bi, sb)|| ≤ |ti − bi|.
Therefore,
F (b, sb)− F (t, st) ≤ F (b, sb)− F (t, sb) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
|P (|bi −Q(bi, sb)|)− P (|ti −Q(ti, sb)|)| ≤
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
B||bi −Q(bi, sb)| − |ti −Q(ti, sb)|| ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
B|ti − bi| ≤ Bβ.
Using symmetrical arguments we conclude that F (t, st)− F (b, sb) ≤ Bβ. Combining the last
inequalities implies that
|max
s
F (t, s)−max
s
F (b, s)| = |F (t, st)− F (b, sb)| ≤ Bβ,
as claimed.
QED
Proof of Theorem 2: From the second part of Lemma 5 we can conclude, by taking expectation
on both sides with respect to the mechanism M at the announcement vector b, that |FM(b, b) −
FM(t, b)| ≤ Bβ and so FM(t, b) ≥ FM(b, b)|−Bβ ≥ maxs F (b, s)− 3n ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
)−Bβ,
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 1. Invoking Lemma 6 implies that FM(t, b) ≥
maxs F (t, s) − Bβ − 3n ln
(
e+ (n)K+1
) − Bβ = maxs F (t, s) − 2Bβ − 3n ln (e+ (n)K+1) ,
as required.
QED
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 restated: If  ≤ B
2I
then for any i, any bi, ti ∈ T and any t−i ∈ T n−1,
UnM(t
i, (bi, t−i)) ≤ UnM(ti, t) + 4B|ti − bi|.
Proof of Theorem 3:
UnM(t
i, (bi, t−i)) =
∫
s∈S
I − |ti −Q(bi, s)|
I
dM(b
i, t−i)(s)
=
∫
s∈S
I − |ti −Q(bi, s)|
I
enF ((b
i,t−i),s)∫
s′∈S e
nF ((bi,t−i),s′) ds′
ds
≤
∫
s∈S
I − |ti −Q(bi, s)|
I
e
n
(
F ((ti,t−i),s)+B |t
i−bi|
n
)
∫
s′∈S e
n
(
F (ti,t−i,s′)−B |ti−bi|
n
)
ds′
ds
= e2 B|t
i−bi|
∫
s∈S
I − |ti −Q(bi, s)|
I
d M(t
i, t−i)(s)
≤ e2 B|ti−bi|
∫
s∈S
I − |ti −Q(ti, s)|
I
d M(t
i, t−i)(s)
= e2 B|t
i−bi|UnM(t
i, (ti, t−i)).
It is well known that for any x ∈ [0, 1], ex ≤ 1 + 2x. As 2B|ti − bi| < 1 for any  < B
2I
it
must be that e2B|ti−bi| ≤ 1 + 4 B|ti − bi|. Therefore:
UnM(t
n, (bn, t−n)) ≤ (1 + 4B|ti − bi|)UnM(ti, (ti, t−i)) ≤ UnM(ti, (ti, t−i)) + 4B|ti − bi|).
QED
7.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 restated: If |bn − tn| ≥ 2−(m¯−1) then Un
M(obl m¯)
(tn, t) ≥ Un
M(obl m¯)
(tn, (bn, t−n)) +
‖tn−bn‖21
m¯8I2B
.
Proof of Lemma 1: For any realization, i, of Iˆ let δi denote
δi =
{
0 if |tni − bni | < 2−(m¯−1)/I
|tni − bni | otherwise
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Let i be such that δi > 0. Then there exists a realization, xi ∈ {1, . . . , m¯− 1} of X such that
1
I2xi
<
|tni −bni |
2
≤ 2
I2xi
.
Assume without loss of generality that tni < b
n
i . Conditioning on Iˆ = i and X = xi there
exists a realization of gˆ such that resulting pair of variants, β and γ satisfy Q(tn, s(Xˆ, β, γ)) = β,
Q(bn, s(Xˆ, β, γ)) = γ and ‖β − γ‖1 = 1I2Xˆ .16
For this realization
un(tn, Q(tn, s))− un(tn, Q(bn, s)) = V n(‖tn − β‖1)− V n(‖tn − γ‖1) ≥
1
B
‖β − γ‖1 ≥ 1
B
1
I2xi
≥ 1
B
|tni − bni |
2
=
1
B
δi
2
.
Thus, conditional on Iˆ = i and X = xi the expected decrease in utility is:
un(tn, Q(tn, s))− un(tn, Q(bn, s)) = 1
I2xi
1
B
δi
2
≥ 1
B
δ2i
4
.
The probability of the realization X = xi is 1m¯ and hence conditional on Iˆ = i:
un(tn, Q(tn, s))− un(tn, Q(bn, s)) ≥ 1
m¯B
δ2i
4
.
On the other hand if δi = 0 then clearly a similar inequality holds.
Taking expectation with respect to Iˆ:
UnM(obl m¯)(t
n, t)− UnM(obl m¯)(tn, (bn, t−n)) ≥
∑
i δ
2
i
m¯4IB
=
‖δ‖22
m¯4IB
=
1
m¯4IB
(‖tn − bn‖22 −
∑
{i:|tni −bni |<2−(m¯−1)/I}
(|tni − bni |)2) ≥
1
m¯4IB
(‖tn − bn‖22 − I · (2−(m¯−1)/I)2)
≥ 1
m¯4IB
(
(‖tn − bn‖1√
I
)2
− 2
−(2¯m−2)
I
)
=
‖tn − bn‖21 − 2−(2¯m−2)
m¯4I2B
≥ ‖t
n − bn‖21
m¯8I2B
.
QED
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